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Abstract. A new instantiation of the Cramer-Shoup paradigm for secure
encryption is presented, which is built using bilinear map groups. The se-
curity is based on the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The
recent efficiency improvements introduced in [KD04,GS04] are also applied
to our constructions. One of the schemes thereby obtained presents efficiency
similar to the most efficient encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext se-
curity in the standard model proposed in the literature. Our new scheme
presents advantages compared to a trivial Cramer-Shoup instantiation us-
ing bilinear map groups, which we also describe here for the first time. Only
three practical instantiations of the Cramer-Shoup framework were previ-
ously known.
Keywords: public key encryption, chosen-ciphertext security, standard model, bi-
linear map groups.
1 Introduction
Chosen-ciphertext security against adaptive adversaries (CCA) is generally consid-
ered [RS92,DDN00,NY90,BDPR98] as the right notion of security for a general pur-
pose public key encryption scheme. Although schemes based on general assumptions
meeting this security level [DDN00,Sah99,Lin03] are known, they are quite ineffi-
cient. Only a few schemes proven secure in the standard model (that is, without
using the Random Oracle heuristic [BR93]) and yet practical have been proposed.
For now on, ‘CCA security’ will stand for ‘CCA security in the standard model’.
In [CS98] Cramer and Shoup introduced the first truly practical CCA cryptosys-
tem, based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The same authors gave
later [CS02] a general framework that allows to obtain new CCA cryptosystems
whose security is based on other assumptions, namely, the Quadratic Residuosity
[GM84] and n-Residuosity [Pai99] assumptions. Their generic construction uses the
key concept of Universal Hash Proof System (HPS). A HPS is not only an elegant
mathematical object; although it was proposed to design CCA schemes based on
some classical computational assumptions, it can be used in other contexts, such as
in the design of password-based authenticated key exchange [GL03].
In this work, a new HPS instantiation is provided, which uses bilinear map
groups. The properties of this new instantiation are based on the now classical
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption [Jou00,BF03]. It was previ-
ously an open problem to obtain a non-trivial HPS instantiation using bilinear map
groups. Actually, using a modified version of the original HPS from [CS98] in the
image group of the bilinear map, one trivially obtains a HPS based on the BDDH
assumption. This is due to the fact that the BDDH assumption implies the Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the bilinear image group. We show that
the non-trivial HPS based on BDDH provided in this paper is not only a theoretical
result, but it also provides some benefits over the trivial instantiation.
In this way, we describe the hybrid cryptosystem resulting from applying the
techniques in [KD04,GS04] to our new hash proof system. The IND-CCA scheme
thereby obtained presents remarkable bandwith savings with respect to the scheme
derived from the trivial BDDH-based HPS, and it is also competitive with respect
to the most efficient BDDH-based encryption schemes in the literature, which are
found in [BK05].
The rest of this work is organized as follows. The key ingredients of the Cramer-
Shoup framework are summarized in Section 2. In Section 3, bilinear map groups
are presented. In the following section, a new Universal Hash Proof System using
bilinear map groups is proposed. In Section 5 two new CCA encryption schemes are
described. The first one is obtained applying the techniques by Cramer and Shoup
[CS02] to the new HPS, while the second one is a hybrid encryption scheme using
the refinements by Kurosawa and Desmedt [KD04]. Finally, we conclude in Section
6 comparing the new hybrid scheme with the previous IND-CCA schemes using
bilinear groups and proven secure in the standard model.
2 Main tools of Cramer and Shoup’s construction
The main building blocks of the public key cryptosystem introduced by Cramer
and Shoup are so-called projective hash families, subset membership problems and
hash proof systems. We include an informal summary of these notions (follow-
ing [GMSV05]). We refer to [CS02] for more detailed information.
2.1 Projective Hash Families
A projective hash family (PHF) is a family of functions {Hk : X → Π}k∈K along
with a map α : K −→ S and a subset L ⊂ X such that, for all k ∈ K, α(k)
determines the restriction of Hk to L. A projective hash family is made explicit by
the tuple H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α).
We say H is -universal if for any x ∈ X \ L and for a randomly chosen k, the
probability of correctly guessing Hk(x) from x and α(k) is at most . Moreover, we
say H is -universal2 if even knowing the value of Hk in some x∗ ∈ X \ {x}, the
value of Hk(x) can be only guessed correctly with probability at most . On the
other hand, we say H is -smooth if the probability distributions of (x, s,Hk(x))
and (x, s, pi), where k, x and pi are chosen uniformly at random in K, X \L and Π
respectively, and s = α(k), are -close. These concepts capture some ways to limit
the amount of information given by α(k) about the behavior of Hk on X \ L. A
stronger notion was introduced by Kurosawa and Desmedt [KD04]. They call H
strongly -universal2 if the probability distribution of Hk(x) for a random k ∈ K
conditioned to s = α(k) and Hk(x∗) = pi∗, is -close to the uniform distribution on
Π, for any (possible) choice of x ∈ X \ L, x∗ ∈ X \ {x}, s ∈ S and pi∗ ∈ Π.
2.2 Subset Membership Problems
Many decisional assumptions in the literature can be formulated in terms of indis-
tinguishability of two probability distributions; usually the uniform distribution on
a certain set X and the uniform distribution on a subset L ⊂ X.
In order to fit in the framework of complexity theory, it is needed to provide an
algorithm called the instance generator, that on input the complexity parameter,
1l, outputs a description i of a set Xi and a subset Li ⊂ Xi. Also, the instance
generator outputs a witness set Wi whose elements provide ‘proofs of membership’
to the elements in Li, that is, given x ∈ Li, there exists w ∈ Wi that can be used
to prove x is in Li.
A subset membership problemM is specified by means of the collection of distri-
butions (Il)l∈Z+ together with some sampling and verifying algorithms (see [CS02]).
Moreover,M is hard if the probability distributions (i, x) and (i, x′), where i is the
output of the instance generator and x, x′ are uniformly distributed on Li and
Xi \ Li respectively, are polynomially indistinguishable.
2.3 Universal Hash Proof Systems
A hash proof system (HPS) P binds a subset membership problem and a collection
of projective hash families.
More precisely, an instance i of P is described by the instance (Xi, Li,Wi) of the
subset membership problem and the instance (Hi,Ki, Xi, Li,Πi, Si, αi) of the pro-
jective hash family, and some additional efficient algorithms. Hereafter, the subindex
i will be removed for sake of simplicity. Some of the algorithms provided by an in-
stance i ∈ P are:
– the private evaluation algorithm, that on inputs i, k ∈ K and x ∈ X, outputs
Hk(x),
– a sampling algorithm for L×W , that on input i, outputs a random x ∈ L and
a witness w ∈W for x,
– the public evaluation algorithm, that on inputs i, s ∈ S and x ∈ L, outputs
Hk(x), for any k ∈ K such that s = α(k).
Notions of universality and smoothness for P are directly inherited from those
of the underlying projective hash families. However, now  has to be seen as a
negligible function on the complexity parameter.
A convenient extended notion of hash proof system is also provided, and consists
only of replacing the sets X and L by X ×E and L×E, where E is a suitable set.
Also, in the extended systems a value e ∈ E is given as an additional input to both
the private and the public evaluation algorithms.
2.4 Group Systems and Projective Hashing
Let X and Π be two finite abelian groups. Multiplicative notation will be used for
all groups, thus the unit element will be denoted as 1. Let H be a finite subgroup
of Hom(X,Π). Let χ : H → S be a group epimorphism. Note that for any φ ∈ H,
χ(φ) gives some (limited) information about φ.
For any x ∈ X let Πx = {η(x) | η ∈ kerχ}. Let L be the set {x ∈ X | |Πx| = 1},
which is a subgroup of X. Observe that χ(φ) determines the action of φ on L. The
tuple (X,Π,H, χ, S) is called a group system. Denote by ~ : K → H a bijection from
a suitable index set K. Noticing that χ(~(k)) determines the restriction of ~(k) to L
completely, it is easy to see that (H,K,X,L,Π, S, χ◦~) is a projective hash family.
This PHF is called a group projective hash family (GPHF), and is made explicit
by the tuple (X,Π,H,K, S, χ, ~). It can be shown that this PHF is 1/p-universal,
where p is the least prime divisor of [X : L].
Further on, denote by n a positive integer and by E a finite set. Let us define a
new extended projective hash family Hˆ by means of n+1 independent copies of H
and a “gluing” function gHγ : H
n+1 → H defined by: gHγ (φ0, . . . , φn) := φ0φγ11 · · ·φγnn
where γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Zn and φγii (x) := φi(x)γi .
Now, Kˆ = Kn+1, Sˆ = Sn+1 and the natural extensions χˆ of χ and ~ˆ of ~ are used.
The set X is extended to Xˆ = X×E. Further, given kˆ, we define Φkˆ : X×E 7−→ Π
by
Φkˆ(x, e) := g
H
γ(x,e)(~ˆ(kˆ))(x),
where Γ : (x, e) 7→ (γ1(x, e), . . . , γn(x, e)) is an injective map from X × E into
{0, . . . , p− 1}n. Let us denote by Hˆ the set {Φkˆ | kˆ ∈ Kˆ}.
It can be shown that Hˆ = (Hˆ, Kˆ,X ×E,L×E,Π, Sˆ, χˆ ◦ ~ˆ) is a 1/p-universal2 ex-
tended projective hash family. In particular, it is proven the statistical independence
between Φkˆ(x, e) and Φkˆ(x
∗, e∗) for any choice of different pairs (x, e), (x∗, e∗) ∈
X × E, and for a random kˆ ∈ Kˆ conditioned to a value of χˆ(~ˆ(kˆ)). This implies
that if H is also smooth, then Hˆ is strongly universal2.
3 Bilinear map groups
We use the following notation:
1. G and G1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p.
2. g is a generator of G.
3. e is a bilinear map e : G×G→ G1.
Let G and G1 be two groups as above. A bilinear map is a map e : G×G→ G1
with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, ub) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear map group or bilinear group if the group action in G
can be computed efficiently, there exists a group G1 and an efficiently computable
bilinear map e : G×G→ G1 as above, and computing discrete logarithms in G and
G1 is assumed to be hard.
We now state the assumptions that are of interest to us in this context.
Assumption 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption). Let G be
a group with prime order p and let g be a generator of G. Then the probability
distributions (g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc) are polynomially indistinguishable, that
is, for any PPT algorithm A the probability∣∣Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gab) = 1]− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc) = 1]∣∣
is negligible, where the probability is computed with respect to the coin tosses of A
and a, b, and c are taken uniformly at random in Zp.
Assumption 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption).
[Jou00,BF03] Let G and G1 be two groups with prime order p and let e : G ×
G → G1 be an efficiently computable bilinear map. Let g be a generator of G.
Then the probability distributions (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) and (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)r)
are polynomially indistinguishable, that is, for any PPT algorithm A the probability∣∣Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)r) = 1]∣∣
is negligible, where the probability is computed with respect to the coin tosses of A
and a, b, c and r are taken uniformly at random in Zp.
As pointed out in [Jou00], the DDH assumption in a bilinear group G is false,
while the BDDH assumption in (G,G1) implies the DDH assumption in G1. For
this reason, a trivial HPS based on BDDH can be built in the image group G1
using the techniques by [CS98], since such a system has security based on the DDH
assumption in G1. In the next section we investigate if it is possible to build a HPS
different from that trivial one. It turns out that this is possible, and we obtain a
BDDH-based HPS which can not be reduced to the straightforward DDH-based
HPS in G1.
4 A New Universal Hash Proof System
Let G a bilinear map group with e : G × G → G1. Let g be a generator of G
and let ga and gb random elements in G∗, where G∗ denotes the group G except
for the identity element. Thus, a and b are random elements in Z∗p. Consider the
group X = G × G1 and the subgroup La,b generated by (g, e(ga, gb)). Notice that
an element c ∈ Zp serves as a witness for x = (gc, e(g, g)abc)) in La,b. Then, let
W = Zp. The subset membership problem defined by X and L is hard if and only
if the BDDH assumption holds (actually both problems are reformulations of the
same problem except for the fact that, in the subset membership problem, c = 0 is
allowed).
Let us consider the following group system. Let pi = G1 and H = Hom(G ×
G1,G1). There is a bijection from K = Zp × Zp to H, which maps (k1, k2) ∈
Zp ×Zp to the homomorphism φk1,k2 ∈ H defined as φk1,k2(h, h1) = e(hk1 , g)hk21 =
e(h, g)k1hk21 , with h ∈ G and h1 ∈ G1. Now, let S = G1 and define the map
χ : H → S as χ(φk1,k2) = φk1,k2(g, e(ga, gb)) = e(g, g)k1e(ga, gb)k2 . It is easy to
prove that the definitions of χ and L are consistent (in the sense of Section 2.4),
hence the group system (G×G1,G1,H, χ,G1) is p-diverse. Therefore, 1/p-universal
and extended 1/p-universal2 projective hash families can be built from this group
system.
In order to build universal, smooth and universal2 hash proof systems, it suffices
to show efficient algorithms for sampling L×W and for public and private evaluation
of the hash functions. In order to sample L ×W , firstly peek at random c ∈ Zp
and output the pair ((gc, e(ga, gb)c), c). The private evaluation algorithm, on inputs
(k1, k2) ∈ Zp × Zp and x = (h, h1) ∈ G × G1, returns φk1,k2(x) = e(h, g)k1hk21 .
The public evaluation algorithm computes the same value but starting from inputs
s = χ(φk1,k2) = e(g, g)
k1e(ga, gb)k2 , x = (gc, e(ga, gb)c) ∈ L and c ∈ W , just using
the expression φk1,k2(x) = e(g
c, g)k1e(ga, gb)ck2 = e(g, g)ck1e(ga, gb)ck2 = sc, an the
latter value can be computed publicly.
The smoothness of the hash proof system is directly inherited from the smooth-
ness of its underlying projective hash family. The later means that the two probabil-
ity distributions (x, s, φk1,k2(x)) and (x, s, h1) are statistically close, where (k1, k2) ∈
Zp × Zp, x ∈ X \ L and h1 ∈ G1 are chosen uniformly at random, and s =
e(g, g)k1e(ga, gb)k2 . To see this, notice that every x ∈ X \ L can be written as
x = (gc1 , e(ga, gb)c2) for suitable c1, c2 ∈ Zp such that c1 6= c2. Then, φk1k2(x) =
e(g, g)c1k1e(ga, gb)c2k2 = sc1e(ga, gb)(c2−c1)k2 . Hence, for any choice of s, c1 and c2,
φk1k2(x) is uniformly distributed on G1. This means in particular that the extended
projective hash family obtained applying the construction in Section 2.4 to this new
HPS is smooth, and therefore, strongly universal2.
5 New CCA Encryption Schemes
In this section we describe two new cryptosystems using the universal hash proof
system introduced in the previous section. The first one is just an instance of the
encryption scheme described in [CS02], while the second one is an efficient and
compact hybrid cryptosystem derived from the constructions in [KD04] and [GS04].
5.1 Cramer and Shoup CCA Cryptosystem
Roughly speaking, in the scheme proposed by Cramer and Shoup [CS02], given
a smooth HPS for a hard membership problem, a message m ∈ Π is encrypted
by using Hk(x) as a one time pad. Also, x and α(k) are revealed while k is kept
secret. CCA security is achieved by appending to the ciphertext a ‘proof of integrity’
obtained from a universal2 extended HPS. The set E in the definition of this HPS
is just the message space Π.
More formally, let M be a hard subset membership problem and P, Pˆ be
two HPSs for M, smooth and universal2 extended respectively. An instance of
these objects is described by an instance (X,L,W ) of M and two instances H =
(H,K,X,L,Π, S, α) and Hˆ = (Hˆ, Kˆ,X × Π,L × Π, Πˆ, Sˆ, αˆ) of P and Pˆ, respec-
tively. Note that the instances of both P and Pˆ must share the sets X, L and W
and the sampling algorithm. Once the above parameters are fixed, the algorithms
of the scheme can be described as follows:
Key generation algorithm Choose k ← K and kˆ ← Kˆ uniformly at random,
compute s = α(k) ∈ S, sˆ = αˆ(kˆ) ∈ Sˆ and output (s, sˆ)—the public key—and
(k, kˆ)—the private key.
Encryption algorithm To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Π, first generate x ∈ L and a
corresponding witness w ∈W by means of the sampling algorithm. Then, compute
– pi = Hk(x), (from x, s and w, by using the public evaluation algorithm provided
by P)
– e = m · pi ∈ Π and pˆi = Hˆkˆ(x, e) (from sˆ, x, e and w, by using the public
evaluation algorithm provided by Pˆ).
The output ciphertext is the tuple (x, e, pˆi).
Decryption algorithm To decrypt the received ciphertext (x, e, pˆi),
– compute pˆi′ = Hˆkˆ(x, e) ∈ Πˆ (by means of the private evaluation algorithm of
Pˆ),
– check whether pˆi = pˆi′ and, if not, output reject and halt. Otherwise, compute
pi = Hk(x) ∈ Π (by means of the private evaluation algorithm of P) as well as
the plaintext m = e · pi−1 ∈ Π.
The decryption algorithm is also supposed to recognize and reject bitstrings that
do not correspond to properly ciphered texts, i. e., bitstrings that do not encode an
element of X ×Π ×Π.
5.2 A new Basic Scheme - PKE
The basic scheme is just the instantiation of previous scheme with the hash proof
systems presented in Section 4.
Instance Generation Algorithm
For a given security parameter `, generate a prime p with binary length ` and two
groups G, G1 of order p such that an efficiently-computable non-degenerate bilinear
map e : G × G → G1 exists. Then, peek at random three nontrivial elements
g, ga, gb ∈ G. Let n ≥ 1 and let Γ : G × G1 × G1 → Znp be an injective map. Let
g1 = e(g, g) and g2 = e(ga, gb). Publish (p,G,G1, e, g, ga, gb, g1, g2, n, Γ ).
Key Generation Algorithm
Choose random k1, k2 ∈ Zp and k01, k02, . . . , kn1, kn2 ∈ Zp. These values are part of
the secret key. Compute s = gk11 g
k2
2 and si = g
ki1
1 g
ki2
2 for i = 0, . . . , n and publish
them (along with the instance description) as the public key.
Encryption Algorithm
To encrypt a plaintextm ∈ G1, first peek a random c ∈ Zp and compute x = (gc, gc2)
and t = scm. The ciphertext is (x, t, (s0s
γ1
1 · · · sγnn )c), where (γ1, . . . , γn) = Γ (x, t).
Decryption Algorithm
To decrypt the received ciphertext (x, t, pi), where x = (h, h1) ∈ G×G1
– compute gx = e(h, g).
– compute pi′ = gk01+γ1k11+...+γnkn1x h
k02+γ1k12+...+γnkn2
1 , where (γ1, . . . , γn) = Γ (x, t).
– check whether pi = pi′ and, if not, output reject and halt. Otherwise, compute
and output the plaintext m = t/(gk1x h
k2
1 ).
This algorithm is also supposed to recognize and reject bitstrings that do not cor-
respond to properly ciphered texts, i. e., bitstrings that do not encode an element
of G×G1 ×G1 ×G1.
Theorem 1. If the BDDH assumption holds in G, then the scheme PKE is CCA
secure.
Similarly to [CS98], the injective function Γ used in the definition of the extended
universal2 projective hash family, can be replaced by a Target Collision Resistant
(TCR) hash function, with n = 1 and without losing CCA security. This leads to
an important reduction of encryption and decryption times, and also the length of
the keys is reduced.
5.3 Kurosawa-Desmedt Hybrid Scheme
In [KD04], a practical hybrid cryptosystem, based on any strongly universal2 hash
system, is presented. In combination with a key derivation function, this hash proof
system serves as the generator of a session key, which is used to encrypt the message
with a symmetric cryptosystem. A message authentication code is appended, in
order to achieve CCA security.
More formally, letM be a hard subset membership problem and Pˆ be a strongly
universal2 HPS for M. An instance of these objects is described by an instance
(X,L,W ) ofM and an instance Hˆ = (Hˆ, Kˆ,X,L,Π, Sˆ, αˆ) of Pˆ. Let KDF be a key
derivation function defined on Π with output a pair of keys. Consider a symmetric-
key encryption scheme, with encryption function Ek, decryption function Dk and
message space {0, 1}r. Let MAC be a message authentication code.
Key generation algorithm Choose kˆ ← Kˆ uniformly at random, compute sˆ =
αˆ(kˆ) ∈ Sˆ and output (s, sˆ,KDF,MAC)—the public key—and (k, kˆ)—the private
key.
Encryption algorithm To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}r, first generate x ∈ L
and a corresponding witness w ∈ W by means of the sampling algorithm. Then,
compute
– pˆi = Hˆkˆ(x), (from x, sˆ and w, by using the public evaluation algorithm provided
by Pˆ)
– (v1, v2) = KDF (pˆi) and z = Ev1(m)
– t =MACv2(z).
The output ciphertext is the tuple (x, z, t).
Decryption algorithm To decrypt the received ciphertext (x, z, t),
– compute pˆi = Hˆkˆ(x) ∈ Π (by means of the private evaluation algorithm of Pˆ),
– compute (v1, v2) = KDF (pˆi)
– check whether MACv2(z) = t and, if not, output reject and halt. Otherwise,
compute the plaintext m = Dv1(z).
The decryption algorithm is also supposed to recognize and reject bitstrings that
do not correspond to properly ciphered texts.
Although a proof for CCA security is given in the original paper, there is an alter-
native proof for the same cryptosystem in [GS04] with fewer assumptions. Namely,
it is required that the symmetric-key encryption scheme has indistinguishability
of encryptions, that MACv(z) must be hard to compute from MACv(z′) for any
choice of z, z′ and a random v; and that it must be hard to distinguish KDF (pi)
from a random pair (v1, v2).
5.4 A New Hybrid Scheme - HE
The basic scheme is just the instantiation of the previous general scheme with the
hash proof system presented in Section 4.
Instance Generation Algorithm
For a given security parameter `, generate a prime p with binary length ` and two
groups G, G1 of order p such that an efficiently-computable non-degenerate bilinear
map e : G × G → G1 exists. Then, peek at random three nontrivial elements
g, ga, gb ∈ G. Let n ≥ 1 and let Γ : G × G1 → Znp be an injective map. Let
g1 = e(g, g) and g2 = e(ga, gb). Publish (p,G,G1, e, g, ga, gb, g1, g2, n, Γ ).
Key Generation Algorithm
Choose random k01, k02, . . . , kn1, kn2 ∈ Zp. These values are part of the secret key.
Compute si = gki11 g
ki2
2 for i = 0, . . . , n and publish them (along with the instance
description) as the public key.
Encryption Algorithm
To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}r, first peek a random c ∈ Zp and compute
x = (gc, gc2), pˆi = (s0s
γ1
1 · · · sγnn )c and (v1, v2) = KDF (pˆi). Then, let z = Ev1(m) and
t =MACv2(z). The ciphertext is (x, z, t).
Decryption Algorithm
To decrypt the received ciphertext (x, z, t), where x = (h, h1) ∈ G×G1
– compute gx = e(h, g).
– compute pˆi = gk01+γ1k11+...+γnkn1x h
k02+γ1k12+...+γnkn2
1 , where (γ1, . . . , γn) = Γ (x).
– compute (v1, v2) = KDF (pˆi) and check whether MACv2(z) = t and, if not,
output reject and halt. Otherwise, compute the plaintext m = Dv1(z).
This algorithm is also supposed to recognize and reject bitstrings that do not cor-
respond to properly ciphered texts.
Theorem 2. If the BDDH assumption holds in G, the symmetric-key encryption
scheme has indistinguishability of encryptions, MACv(z) is hard to compute from
MACv(z′) for any choice of z, z′ and a random v, and it is hard to distinguish
KDF (pi) from a random pair (v1, v2), then the scheme PKE2 is CCA secure.
As in PKE, the injective function Γ can be replaced by a target collision resistant
hash function, with n = 1 and without losing CCA security.
6 Efficiency Analysis of Some Encryption Schemes using
Bilinear Groups
In this section we compare the efficiency of the scheme HE from Section 5.4 to the
existing practical IND-CCA schemes with security based on the BDDH assumption.
We start by describing our scheme HE with n = 1 as well as the trivial BDDH-based
scheme KD obtained by implementing [CS98,KD04] in the group G1.
Practical HE
Instance Generation. As in Section 5.4. The global parameters are then
params = (p,G,G1, e, g, ga, gb, g1, g2, n,H),
where H : G×G1 → Zp is a TCR hash function, and g ∈ G; g1, g2 ∈ G1.
Key Generation. Choose random k1, k2, k˜1, k˜2 ∈ Zp. Compute s = gk11 gk22 and
s˜ = g
ek1
1 g
ek2
2 . The public key is pk = (params, s, s˜) and the secret key is sk =
(pk, k1, k2, k˜1, k˜2).
Encryption. To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}r, pick a random c ∈ Zp and compute x =
(gc, gc2), α = H(x), pi = (ss˜
α)c and (v1, v2) = KDF (pi). Then, let z = Ev1(m) and
t =MACv2(z). The ciphertext is (x, z, t).
Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (x, z, t), where x = (h, h1) ∈ G×G1
– compute gx = e(h, g) and α = H(x).
– compute pi = gk1+αek1x h
k2+αek2
1 .
– compute (v1, v2) = KDF (pi) and check whether MACv2(z) = t and, if not,
output reject and halt. Otherwise, compute the plaintext m = Dv1(z).
Bilinear KD
Instance Generation. As in Practical HE scheme.
Key Generation. As in Practical HE scheme.
Encryption. To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}r, pick a random c ∈ Zp and compute x =
(gc1, g
c
2), α = H(x), pi = (ss˜
α)c and (v1, v2) = KDF (pi). Then, let z = Ev1(m) and
t =MACv2(z). The ciphertext is (x, z, t).
Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (x, z, t), where x = (h1, h2) ∈ G1 ×G1
– compute pi = hk1+α
ek1
1 h
k2+αek2
2 .
– compute (v1, v2) = KDF (pi) and check whether MACv2(z) = t and, if not,
output reject and halt. Otherwise, compute the plaintext m = Dv1(z).
We note that we are not aware of any previous description of the scheme Bi-
linear KD in the literature. Regarding security assumptions, recall that BDDH
assumption ⇒ Practical HE is secure and that BDDH assumption ⇒ DDH as-
sumption in G1 ⇒ Bilinear KD is secure. In the next table we compare the effi-
ciency of these two schemes with the most efficient CCA scheme based on BDDH
found previously in the literature, which is called Scheme 1 in [BK05] and is referred
here as BK. When tabulating computational efficiency, we have ignored symmetric
components operations; G-exp stands for a full exponentiation in G, while G1-s.exp
stands for a ’short exponentiation’ in G1, ’pair.’ for a bilinear map computation,
and `G, `G1 for the bit length needed to represent elements in those respective sets.
It is usually the case with bilinear maps that `G  `G1 . Actually, for the most effi-
cient implementation of bilinear maps currently available, `G ≈ 170 and `G1 ≈ 1024
[PSV04]. Notice that all exponents can be reduced modulo p, so all exponentiations
in G1 are short (i.e.: with a typical exponent of 170 bits instead of 1024). For the
number of exponentiations, multiexponentiations in G1 are computed as single ex-
ponentiations with respect to the same base g1 whenever possible (for instance, the
recipient of the communications can keep knowledge of the discrete logarithm of g2
with respect to g1).
Encryption Decryption Key Generation Ciph. overhead
HE 1 G-exp + 3 G1-s.exp 2 G1-s.exp + 1 pair. 2G1-s.exp `G + `G1 + 128
KD 4 G1-s.exp 2 G1-s.exp 2G1-s.exp 2`G1 + 128
BK 3 G-exp + 1 G1-s.exp 2 G-exp + 2 pair. 1 G-exp + 2 G1-s.exp 2`G + 704
It turns out that evaluating a bilinear map is the most time consuming operation
in cryptosystems using bilinear groups [GHS02,BKLS02]. Also, we can assume that
a full exponentiation in G is 3 times faster than a short exponentiation in G1 for
the current security level, since `G  `G1 . This ratio is obtained by considering the
typical case: G is a subgroup of an elliptic curve over a field F0 of size about 2170
and G is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of an extension F of degree 6 of F0.
With these data, it is not possible to select one of these schemes as the most
efficient one from a global point of view. The scheme Bilinear KD presents the
most efficient decryption procedure, and our scheme (Practical HE) has more ef-
ficient decryption than BK scheme. Regarding encryption time, BK scheme is the
best, followed by our scheme and finally Bilinear KD scheme. Regarding ciphertext
length, BK presents the smallest overhead, while our scheme has roughly a 850 bits
smaller overhead than Bilinear KD scheme.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a new Universal Hash Proof System (HPS) built using bilinear
map groups. Only three HPS instantiations were previously known. We have also
presented two new efficient IND-CCA schemes which use bilinear groups and have
security based on the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The first scheme
is obtained thanks to the new HPS proposed in this work, while the second one is
obtained by a particular case of the scheme [KD04]. These schemes turn out to be
as efficient as the previous similar constructions in [BK05].
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